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Flying high (in the competitive sky): Conceptualizing the role of airports in global city-
regions through “aero-regionalism” 
 
Abstract: Airports are key catalysts for urban growth and economic development in an era of 
global urbanization. In addition to their global economic functions, the multiscalar 
connectivity and localized impacts of air transport infrastructure place them at the heart of 
city-regional politics and planning. Yet the relations between global air transport, economic 
development and city-regionalism remain under-theorized. This paper introduces the concept 
of aero-regionalism to explore the relationality/territoriality dialectic and mechanisms of state 
territorialization unfurling at the nexus of globalization, air transport, city-regionalism and air 
transport. I provide a relational geographic comparison of the impact of varying local 
institutional arrangements and policy frameworks on the political and infrastructural 
integration of airports in the global city-regions of Chicago and Toronto. The paper analyzes 
the relative significance of variations in local transportation and planning systems to develop 
our understanding of the relations between global aviation infrastructures and their 
surrounding regional spaces, and the connectivity between major global ports and local 
transportation capillaries in global city-regions. The concept of aero-regionalism advances our 
understanding of the urban political economy of airports by uncovering how competitive 
economic globalization, state spatiality and the development of large-scale airport 
infrastructures are mediated through the symbiotic, if contested, co-production of urban and 
air space. While divergent governance regimes have shaped the development of urban 
transportation networks in the two case city-regions, the imperatives of globalization and 
neoliberalization are pressuring the material, political and discursive regionalization of airport 
space while privileging the logics of premium networked mobility.  
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1. Introduction 
Air transportation holds a privileged position in studies of global city formation, development 
and connectivity. Globalization, Kesselring (2009, p. 41) observes, not only “lands on the 
runways of the international air hubs – but it also takes of from them”. Airports function as key 
interfaces through which global networks are moored in place and the metropolises in which they 
are located are both deeply integrated with, and affected by, the recalibrated propinquity 
engendered by air travel (Hall, 2009; Urry, 2009). Access to advanced air transportation plays a 
fundamental role in determining the relative centrality of cities within multiscalar urban systems 
(Alberts, Bowen and Cidell, 2009; Guimerà et al., 2005; Mukkala and Tervo, 2013; Witlox and 
Derudder, 2007). Efficient, cost-effective transportation connections are a prerequisite for 
companies to employ advanced logistical techniques (Erie, 2004; O’Connor, 2003) and for 
localities to market themselves as global business hubs (Beaverstock et al., 2009; Jones, 2009; 
McNeill, 2009). As a result, non-stop flight linkages prominently factor in global city rankings 
(Foreign Policy, 2010; see Derudder, van Nuffel and Witlox, 2009; Keeling, 1995). A 
generalized global shift towards the deregulation and privatization of commercial air 
transportation over the past four decades has only served to deepen the centrality of air 
infrastructure within a competitive, increasingly urbanized, global economy (Freestone, 2011; 
Sinha, 1999; Small, 1993; Yang, Tok and Su, 2008). The commercialization of airport 
management has proceeded apace and airport facilities are now regularly incorporated in private 
global investment portfolios (Graham, 2013; McNeill, 2010; Torrance, 2008).  
City leaders around the world are under mounting pressure to expand air capacity in order 
to ensure their locality’s position in the world city network. Against this backdrop, an influential 
policy consensus – employed to varying degrees (and with varying degrees of effectiveness) from 
Amsterdam, Frankfurt and Phoenix to Cairo, Singapore and Belo Horizonte – has crystallized 
 4 
around the growth potential of the “airport city” or “aerotropolis” (Appold and Kasarda, 2013; 
Blanton, 2004; Güller and Güller 2003; Kasarda, 1995; Kasarda and Sullivan, 2006). Cities are 
advised to embrace their airports by developing advanced, modally integrated facilities that can 
maximize locational advantages for New Economy industries “with the ultimate aim of bolstering 
the city’s competiveness, job creation, and quality of life” (Kasarda and Lindsay, 2011, p. 174).  
Investment in airport-enabling urban development, though, is neither a simple nor 
sustainable panacea for the challenges of economic globalization (Charles et al., 2007). 
Globalizing airport facilities require extensive and extended capital investment alongside the 
place-based accumulation of technological knowledge and organizational and geopolitical power 
(Graham and Marvin, 2001, p. 21). Aviation connectivity exposes urban centers to the threats of 
terrorism (Graham, 2006) and enhances vulnerability to global pandemics (Ali, 2006; Budd, Bell 
and Warren, 2011). Geographically uneven economic development, in addition to localized 
environment impacts, invoke a complex and contested politics of scale surrounding airport 
infrastructure (Stevens, Baker and Freestone, 2010). McNeill (2014, p. 4) unpacks the 
territoriality of airport space to disclose a complex geography of political power including: 
uneasy webs of actors enmeshed within multiscalar governance regimes; a reticulated network of 
global (dis)connectivity; functional corridors for aircraft movement that are often the source of 
conflict between competing technical and social demands; and surveillance spaces through which 
personal mobility, identity and affect are constructed and contested. As territorial gateways, 
airports are spaces of regulation, securitization and Othering as much as interfaces expediting 
global flows and economic activity (Adey, 2009; Lisle, 2003; Salter, 2008a). Here, Adey (2010, 
p. 7) suggests extended ‘aeromobility’ facilitates new practices and regimes of post-national 
citizenship that now “define and undo more traditional concepts of citizen and territory”.  
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Despite a resurgence of interest in the mobilities, territoriality, and cultural economy of 
air transport, relations between air infrastructure, globalization and local economic development 
remain under-theorized (Cidell, 2006a, p. 654; Evans and Hutchins, 2002, p. 429; McNeill, 2011, 
p. 154). Much global cities and global city networks literature, as well as empirical aerotropolis 
studies, tends to treat the politics and economics of air transport uncritically, often deploying 
weak scalar theorizing. By focusing analytical attention on issues of inequality, corporate power 
and cross-border networks, seminal studies by Abu-Lughod (1999), Massey (2005) and Sassen 
(1991, 2012) afford only a marginal role to the political economy of international airports in 
global city formation and politics. For instance, in her otherwise stellar study of America’s global 
cities, Abu-Lughod’s (1999, p. 353) limited engagement with O’Hare International Airport 
renders Chicago’s foremost globalizing infrastructure a patronage project for the city’s growth 
machine.1 Air traffic data are regularly used to demonstrate the relational connectivity of global 
city networks (Mahutga et al., 2010; Neal, 2010). However, the use of airline flows as a gauge for 
globalization presents significant methodological and analytical limitations – e.g. the need to 
distinguish between destination and stopover airports and account for the state-centric nature of 
many airline networks (Derudder, van Nuffel and Witlox, 2009; Taylor, 2004, p. 38; van de 
Vijver et al., 2014) – while giving little consideration to how global flows are actually grounded 
in, and structured by, local sociospatial structures.  
Normative assumptions regarding airports’ economic, social and political impacts are 
substantially codified through quantitative metrics and persistent yet unquestioned tropes of 
global competitiveness (Adey, Budd and Hubbard, 2007). This illustrates, in no small degree, the 
dominant global imaginary that underpins much political discourse on airport-oriented urban 
                                                        
1 Erie (2004) provides an exception by foregrounding the trade and infrastructure networks underpinning 
globalization and urban development in Los Angeles. 
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development. In examining urban politics in Frankfurt (notably surrounding Frankfurt Airport), 
Keil (2011) concludes city elites have effectively “internalized” the imperative to globalize 
within urban governance practices, discourses and institutional frameworks at the expense of 
alternative spatial imaginaries and modes of development. It is necessary to move beyond purely 
topological readings of global city connectivity, as well as quantitative measurements of direct 
flights, passenger numbers and freight movements, to develop a detailed understanding of the 
interactions between economic imperatives, territorial restructuring and multiscalar politics at the 
nexus of urban and air space. 
This paper advances a theoretical framework that situates the territorialization processes 
and modalities of urban politics engendered by international airports within on-going debates on 
the form, function and governance of global city-regions. The argument is organized as follows. 
The paper begins by establishing the regionalizing dynamics of air transportation as an important 
yet understudied dimension of contemporary urbanization. It then details the concept of aero-
regionalism as a means to unpack airports’ territorial and relational position within global city-
regions. The paper’s substantive empirical analysis provides a relational urban comparison of 
airport planning, governance and infrastructural integration in the global city-regions of Chicago 
and Toronto. Analytically shifting the conceptual lens from the global city to global city-region 
represents a moment of strategic rescaling that brings to the fore broad urbanization patterns that 
are understood to be global in nature. Global city-region analysis highlights questions of 
infrastructure, political collaboration and metropolitan spatial structure in a manner that global 
city analysis does not (Hall, 2009; Sassen, 2001). In doing so, it furthers our understanding of the 
urban political economy of major air hubs and their impact on territorial development. The case 
studies illustrate the impact and path-dependence of neoliberalization processes (including those 
triggered by the deregulation of domestic aviation in the United States in 1978 and Canada in 
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1987) on new political and socio-technical fixes – and contradictions – that are now being framed 
at the city-regional scale. The paper concludes by detailing aero-regionalism’s contribution to 
studies of global city-regionalism and practices of airport planning and governance.  
The argument presented here draws from semi-structured interviews with key actors in 
local and regional government, economic development, transportation governance, regional 
planning and community organizations in the Chicago (18) and Toronto (15) city-regions, 
conducted between 2008 and 2011. Interviews were chiefly conducted with urban elites who 
operated as gatekeepers of particular situated knowledges as a result of their political or social 
positions (Ward and Jones, 1999). Archival and secondary data detailing airport planning, public 
debates and community opposition were also reviewed, including planning documents, 
professional reports, community group materials and newspaper articles in both city-regions.2 
 
2. Airports and the challenge of global city-regional urbanization 
Spurred by transformations in the political authority and territoriality of the nation-state in an era 
of intensive globalization, neoliberal approaches to local economic development have galvanized 
an apparent consensus regarding territorial development at the city-regional scale (Deas, 2013; 
Jonas and Ward, 2007; Scott, 2001, 2012; Storper, 2013). With the rise of “rescaled competition 
state regimes”, states operating at a number of scales have prioritized the production and 
governance of regional transportation infrastructure as a spatial strategy to enhance the territorial 
competitiveness of major urban economies, superseding older regionalist frameworks premised 
on a politics of equity and redistribution (Brenner, 2004, pp. 176, 260). A significant strand of 
                                                        
2 In Chicago, materials were reviewed at the Chicago Historical Society Research Center, the Government 
Publications Department of the Harold Washington Library and the Northwestern University Transportation Library. 
In Toronto, collections at the City of Toronto Archives, the Archives of Ontario, the Urban Affairs Library and the 
Clara Thomas Special Collections and Archives Center at York University were consulted. 
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literature points to the geoeconomic role of infrastructure investment within such competitive 
city-regionalism, but Jonas (2013, p. 295) argues the reconfiguration of internal state space 
around new forms of city-regionalism further illustrates a “new territorial politics of collective 
provision”. Here, strategic state investments in transport, housing, utilities etc. are leveraged via 
territorial fixes aimed at securing the conditions for social reproduction at the city-regional scale. 
Local transportation and planning agencies lend themselves to regionalization in this context 
(Addie, 2013; Jonas, Goetz and Bhattacharjee, 2013; MacKinnon and Shaw, 2010). Air transport 
and airport-oriented development, however – while also subjects of neoliberal restructuring – 
pose significant challenges for institutional and infrastructural urban integration, especially when 
considered in relation to the political reterritorialization unfurling via global city-regional 
urbanization. 
The processes through which politically constructed, mobilized and territorialized “spaces 
of regionalism” are realized and rendered visible from the relational “regional spaces” of the 
globalizing economy are complex and often overlooked within urban policy frameworks (Jones 
and MacLeod, 2004). In part, this reflects on-going debates regarding the territorial and relational 
processes producing city-regional space, and indeed, the ontological foundations of the city-
region itself (Amin, 2004; Beaumont and Nicholls, 2007; Harrison, 2010; Jonas and Ward, 2007). 
The forces shaping city-regions are increasingly transnational (Allen and Cochrane, 2010, Smith, 
2003) while experimental neoliberal governance institutionalizes regions as “soft spaces” with 
“fuzzy boundaries” (Allmendinger and Haughton, 2009). Yet even as extra-local actors and 
institutions shape modalities of urban politics, urban flows remain predominantly channeled 
through material spaces and are regulated by territorially defined bodies (Cochrane, 2012; Jonas, 
2012; Morgan, 2007). Analyses of global city-regional urbanization must therefore adequately 
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account for the internal processes of territorialization and external global linkages captured by the 
“relationality/territoriality dialectic” (McCann and Ward, 2010).  
This “real existing regionalism” is the contested product of discourses, technologies 
(material and of power) and territorial relationships (Addie and Keil, in press). In this context, I 
argue investment in global airport infrastructure provides a key tool for strategic state 
interventions in a manner that reflects the complexity of urban territoriality and political power in 
an era of competitive city-regionalism. The airport extends beyond its built form by drawing 
together a myriad of sociotechnical systems and relations “as an organism of the urban economy” 
(McNeill, 2010, p. 2861) and functions as a prominent “symbolic marker” discursively 
legitimizing the processes and practices of neoliberal urbanization (see Dembski, 2013; Pascoe, 
2001). Airports are, as such, an interface between the territorial (as immobile built environments 
embodying vast sums of fixed capital) and topological (channelling and regulating the movement 
of people and commodities) processes supporting the development of global city-regions. The 
effectiveness of airport infrastructure in realizing both their globalizing and localizing functions 
is dependent upon efficient and accessible integration with local transportation systems that 
operate under contradictory logics and scales of mobility (Keil and Young, 2008). Consequently, 
as paradigmatic conflicts in Boston, Frankfurt, San Diego and Tokyo attest, airport 
redevelopment projects often trigger strong opposition from stakeholders with diverse mobility 
requirements and contingent knowledges of airport space (Faburel and Levy, 2009; Kesselring, 
2009). The challenges of infrastructural integration and scaling governance place airports at the 
heart of city-regionalization and city-regional politics. The implications of regional context and 
the relative significance of variations in local governance regimes and policy interventions 
require both conceptual innovation and detailed empirical examination. 
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3. Unpacking aero-regionalism in the Chicago and Toronto city-regions 
In this paper, I depart from normative interpretations of the role and impact of airport-oriented or 
integrated urban development by embedding the development and governance of major airports 
within the overarching processes of city-regionalization. Neither airports, nor their developmental 
logics or urban settings, can be considered as singular, homogenous or uncontested entities in 
isolation (McNeill, 2014). The spatiality of airports emerge as “the product of numerous 
interlocking geopolitical, economic, environmental, social, technical and commercial practices 
that operate at a variety of spatial scales and manifest themselves in different ways in different 
places through time” (Budd, 2009, p. 132). Rather than appearing as a “messy, random, or 
antagonistic” assemblage as Salter (2008b, p. xiv) argues, I follow Harvey (1996a, p. 262) to 
forward the multiple and intersecting spatial processes internalized within airport space acquire a 
“permanence... that assures their character and internal integrity”. Although they remain 
contested social constructs, these place-specific institutional and infrastructural permanences 
provide a degree of stability that endows their associated regional formations with a “structured 
coherence” to facilitate localized capital accumulation and the reproduction of social relations 
while temporally mitigating capitalism’s internal crisis tendencies. This is to say, global airports 
foster distinct modalities of urban governance located within a neoliberal global political 
economy. These interrelate with the production of city-regional space in contingent ways that 
remain conditioned by national and local systems of regulation.  
 I refer to the processes of urban territorialization unfurling at the nexus of globalization, 
city-regionalism and air transport as aero-regionalism. The concept acknowledges airports as 
contested and contradictory urban spaces by paying close attention to how global air hubs’: (1) 
evolving material infrastructure (i.e. terminal development, runway and flight path alignments, 
physical footprint and local transport connections); (2) dynamic governance regimes (e.g. 
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national air regulations, airport and airline management, and transportation and land use 
planning); and (3) multifaceted political and symbolic functions mediate the territorial and 
relational production of city-regions. Aero-regionalism thus brings together facets of airports’ 
territoriality that have previously been examined in isolation (following McNeill, 2014). 
Analytically, the concept focuses on air infrastructures’ sociospatial relations to their regional 
political economic context, opposed to “aeromobilities” and Foucauldian studies that examine the 
spatiality of airports as sites of ordering, discipline and affect (e.g. Adey, 2010; Knox et al., 2008; 
McNeill, 2010; Salter, 2008a). Aero-regionalism aims to reveal the context for strategic state 
selectivity and key mechanisms for scaling state action surrounding global air infrastructure in an 
era of city-regional urbanization. Since the sociotechnical infrastructures of city-regions are 
neither territorially fixed nor discursively static (Addie and Keil, in press; Amin, 2004; Graham 
and Marvin, 2001), I analyze aero-regionalism through a strategic relational framework that: (1) 
conceives the state, and its constituent forms, as a social relation (Jessop, 2007); and (2) adopts 
an open understanding of city-regions as an expression of on-going processes of urbanization that 
are territorialized in place (Harvey, 1996b; Ward, 2010). 
This paper operationalizes the concept of aero-regionalism via a comparative study of the 
politics and connectivity issues surrounding global airports in two North American city-regions: 
Chicago and Toronto. Chicago’s O’Hare International Airport and Toronto’s Pearson 
International Airport are primary continental and global air hubs located in, and serving, highly 
integrated metropolitan regions centered around major global city cores. In this regard they 
represent a particular modality of global urbanization whose territoriality centers on extended 
city-regional agglomerations. The dynamics at play contrast, for instance, the state spatial 
projects of national integration mobilized through newly constructed airport cities emerging 
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across Asia and the Gulf States (McNeill, 2014).3 As the paper details, both O’Hare and Pearson 
Airports have been subject to major redevelopment projects over the passed two decades that 
have raised divergent challenges for city-regional integration [TABLE 1 HERE].4  
Techniques of city-regional territorialization (including planning, infrastructure 
construction and regional institutionalization) have taken hold across northeastern Illinois and 
southern Ontario over the past decade. The imperatives of economic competitiveness and 
resilience, combined with a desire to curb urban sprawl, are now codified in regional policy and 
planning frameworks intended to support polycentric, smart and sustainable urbanization (Addie, 
2013). In Chicago, the new regionalist vision and vigorous lobby of urban elites through Chicago 
Metropolis 2020 (Johnson, 2001) prompted the State of Illinois to consolidate transportation and 
land-use planning in a single institution covering seven counties in northeastern Illinois: the 
Chicago Metropolitan Agency for Planning (CMAP). CMAP’s explicitly holistic vision for future 
regional development prioritized the promotion and facilitation of investment at the city-regional 
scale. The Agency’s comprehensive plan, Go to 2040, emphasized integrated, multimodal 
transportation planning as “the region can no longer afford not to plan effectively” (CMAP, 2010, 
p. 328). In southern Ontario, the Provincial government has been actively promoting an 
integrated program of regional land-use, environmental and transportation policies since 2003. 
Alongside classic modes of governmental regulation, the Province established a regional 
transportation agency, Metrolinx, as a sectoral instrument shaping urban development in the 
Greater Toronto and Hamilton Area (GTHA). Metrolinx’s 25-year, C$50 billion regional 
transportation plan, The Big Move guides the development of transportation infrastructure to 
                                                        
3 The development of air infrastructure in the North America was historically tied to processes of nation building; 
whether through the federal establishment of airmail service in the United States during the 1920s or Ottawa and 
Canadian National founding Trans-Canada Airlines in 1937. Postwar spatial Keynesian projects accelerated the 
integration of national territories, with airports absorbing surplus capital and labor and opening new markets. 
4 Kasarda and Lindsay (2011, pp. 46-58) flag Chicago as a prime example of contested aerotropolis development. 
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concentrate intensified regional growth around a network of “mobility hubs”. Chicago and 
Toronto’s international airports, however, have both been largely removed from institutions 
producing, rendering visible, and governing city-regional space. This is a significant paradox, 
especially in city-regions that aspire to be global.  
 
4. Aero-regionalism Chicago-style: Municipal control and the pressure of 
regionalization 
The Chicago Department of Aviation (CDA) administers all aspects of airport operations at 
O’Hare International Airport and Midway International Airport. As a municipal cabinet position, 
CDA’s Commissioner reports directly to the Mayor’s Office, rendering the Chicago’s chief 
executive the region’s de facto airport manager. Municipal ownership has two central advantages 
for the City of Chicago. First, the City controls the economy of the region’s major aviation 
infrastructure from everyday operations to economic development strategies and long range 
planning. Given the Airports’ importance as economic drivers, this arrangement places 
significant power over the regional economy in the hands of the City of Chicago.5 Second, by 
overseeing airports as a municipal concern, the operation and development of O’Hare and 
Midway are buffered from the conflicting interests of other regional actors. CMAP, for example, 
defers to the City regarding airport-related planning. According to CDA, functioning as a single 
entity reporting to the Mayor enables plans to be efficiently developed and implemented: 
Being a single entity in the City of Chicago, I don’t think you’ll have a situation where you 
have a vision and you start to carry it out and you spend hundreds of millions or billions of 
                                                        
5 CDA operates on a self-sufficient basis and does not use local or state taxes to finance operations or capital 
improvements. Federal tax funding is received through grants distributed by the FAA and Federal DOT. As of 2011, 
CDA (2012a) claims Chicago’s airports generated economic activity in excess of $45 billion per annum ($38 billion 
from O’Hare), and accounted for 540,000 regional jobs (450,000 from O’Hare). 
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dollars on a plan, and then have paralyzing issues internally to stop what you’re doing 
(Rod, interview, 2009). 
Such political autonomy is a double-edged sword. Projects can be developed with limited intra-
governmental disruption. Yet planning expediency limits direct democratic involvement by many 
(mainly suburban) actors in the region while elevating politically mobilized technical knowledge 
of airport space over that of communities impacted by the negative externalities of airport 
operations (see Faburel and Levy, 2009). 
The City of Chicago’s unwillingness to engage in regional conversations on expanding air 
capacity and CDA’s limited involvement with regional governance bodies distances the authority 
responsible for Chicago’s major globalizing infrastructure from the political frameworks of 
regional development. Institutional relationships are predominantly informal and built on 
personal networks rather than forged and regulated through formal bodies of regional or 
transportation governance. CDA’s passive regional role and institutional independence reflects 
the City of Chicago’s traditional political dominance over its collar counties (Hamilton, 2002; 
Lindstrom, 2010) and highlights that the relational economic flows assembled by the globalizing 
airport have tended to exist outwith politically defined “spaces of regionalism”. 
However, Chicago’s structural capacities as a regional actor relative to its suburban 
neighbors have enabled the City to pursue inter-governmental collaborations when politically 
expedient. The Bi-State Compact Agreement signed on August 15, 1995 by the Cities of Chicago 
and Gary Indiana illustrates the impact of the Chicago city-region’s particular jurisdictional 
arrangements and framework of political power in territorializing the relational flows of air 
travel. Redistricting 1990 had shifted political power in the Illinois Legislature (in the mid-state 
capital, Springfield) to State Republicans who favored a developing greenfield airport in south 
suburban Peotone as the means to break Chicago’s aviation dominance and establish a State-
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based regional airport authority (Hamilton, 1999, p. 187). In response, then Chicago mayor 
Richard M. Daley’s deft political maneuvering outflanked his opponents in Springfield by 
brokering the Compact Agreement. This established the Chicago/Gary Airport Authority as a 
legally separate organization empowered to coordinate operations at O’Hare, Midway and newly 
renamed Gary/Chicago International Airport. CDA viewed the Compact as an “alliance… where 
the City of Chicago and the City of Gary have their own interests, but there’s the opportunity that 
is recognized to break down walls of competition” (Rod, interview, 2009). The Compact enabled 
Gary to finally, if modestly, capitalize on its airport’s strategic location 25 miles from Chicago 
(O’Hara, 2003). More significantly, by blocking both Gary and a new suburban airport from 
emerging as competitors, the Compact both safeguarded the City of Chicago’s continued control 
over O’Hare and Midway and negated the political rationale for a regional airport authority.  
Yet the regional impact of Chicago’s airports and persistent purported need to expand air 
capacity suggest the City’s airport governance regime is under pressure. As Chicago’s air 
infrastructure undergoes its latest round of restructuring, suburban actors are looking to enhance 
their influence at O’Hare through regionalizing (or suburbanizing) the Airport’s material 
infrastructure and economic flows. 
 
4.1 The O’Hare Modernization Program 
The 1978 deregulation of domestic air transport in the United States exacerbated calls to expand 
Chicago’s air capacity (see Sinha, 1999). Despite several terminal improvements and the 
Chicago-Gary Bi-State Compact, congestion continued to be an issue at O’Hare through the 
1990s. Moreover, rapid growth at Atlanta’s Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport threatened 
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Chicago’s established position as America’s preeminent global air hub.6 Contrary to 
regionalizing strategies being pursued elsewhere in the United States that sought to ‘spread the 
burden’ of metropolitan air traffic across multiple airports (Cidell, 2006b), Mayor Daley refused 
to allow funds generated at O’Hare and Midway to finance the development of a third airport. 
Rather, he turned his attention to constructing new runways at O’Hare (with the purported 
capacity to reduce overall delays by 79%) and opening a new passenger terminal on the western 
side of the Airport (City of Chicago, 2001). The O’Hare Modernization Program (OMP) 
presented Daley with an opportunity to cement his legacy on Chicago’s landscape, as his father, 
Mayor Richard J. Daley, had done in opening O’Hare nearly five decades earlier. 
While the 9/11 attacks shook the airline industry, both traffic levels and economic activity 
at Chicago’s airports were showing signs of recovery by 2003. Popular and political opinion too 
was moving in favor of O’Hare expansion. Although the City maintained its tendency to operate 
unilaterally and guarded the details of airport development, key members of Chicago’s growth 
machine, including the Commercial Club of Chicago, Business Leaders for Transportation, the 
Chicagoland Chamber of Commerce and Global Chicago backed OMP (Schwieterman, 2006, p. 
288). Andrew McKenna Sr., head of the Civic Committee of the Commercial Club of Chicago, 
declared “O’Hare modernization will be the most important economic development project 
undertaken in Illinois in our lifetime” (cf. Chicago Tribune, 2003, p. 26). In Springfield, the 
downfall of Governor George Ryan (who had backed Peotone Airport) and the 2003 election of 
Rod Blagojevich, a Democratic with strong Chicago connections, brought State backing to the 
City’s airport agenda. Blagojevich signed the O’Hare Modernization Act on August 6, 2003, 
removing State interference from OMP and granting the City of Chicago eminent domain powers 
                                                        
6 Atlanta’s International Airport took O’Hare’s number one ranking in terms of passengers served in 1998; a title 
held by Chicago airports since 1931. Atlanta surpassed O’Hare in terms of annual aircraft movements between 1999 
and 2000 and has held onto the title of America’s busiest airport since 2005.  
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beyond its borders for the project. Springfield thus acknowledged O’Hare’s “essential role” in the 
national air transportation system and OMP’s capacity to “enhance the economic welfare of the 
State” (Illinois General Assembly, 2003). As Springfield scaled-up the economic territory 
through which O’Hare’s impact would reverberate, CDA discursively adopted a regional spatial 
imaginary while, in the same instance, retaining the centrality of Chicago’s municipal interests. 
As an airport planner put it:  
If you want the region to grow, there’s probably nothing better that you can point to in your 
economy as a central focal point [than] an airport… That’s always been the driving force. If 
you’re going to stay strong and be a world-class leader… you’re going to need an airport 
like the one we’re doing (Rod, interview, 2009). 
CDA (2012b) estimated OMP would create 195,000 job and $18 billion in regional economic 
activity while realizing c.$370 million in savings for air carriers and c.$380 million for 
passengers. These economic rationales reinforced and internalized the discourse of global 
competitiveness used by the City to lobby for OMP (Cidell, 2006a, p. 661). 
 
4.2 Negotiating local politics in the global city-region 
Chicago’s aviation governance regime proved extremely effective for the City in marshaling the 
demands for the collective provision of regional air infrastructure. CDA developed OMP in house 
and away from potentially prolonged debates on regional air capacity. OMP moved ahead as a 
project of regional, statewide and national economic significance, but under the guidance, and 
chiefly serving the interests, of the City of Chicago. After receiving State backing in 2003 and 
federal approval in 2005, the City commenced work on OMP and by doing so, attempted to foster 
the view that the project was a fait accompli.  
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OMP, however, faced considerable suburban opposition from two coalitions with political 
and geographically distinct interests in, and knowledge of, Chicago’s air space. The first was 
constituted by south suburban interests including Congressman Jesse Jackson Jr., Will County 
and the South Suburban Mayors and Managers Association (SSMMA). The mainly lower-
income, Democratic and African-American base of the inner south suburbs favored developing 
Peotone Airport as a means to re-center the depressed industrial south within the city-regional 
economy.7 The second coalition, the Suburban O’Hare Commission (SOC), represented a shifting 
network of predominantly wealthy, white, Republican northwestern suburbs that had protested 
expansion at O’Hare since the 1980s. At its height, SOC brought together 17 municipalities 
concerned with the impacts of congestion, noise and air pollution on their communities. While 
the south suburban coalition’s political connections and desire to bring an airport to Peotone 
necessitated the maintenance of cordial relations with the City of Chicago, SOC had no interest in 
conducting a regional dialogue and adopted a bunker mentality (Schwieterman, 2006). SOC’s 
most vocal members were those threatened by annexation of 433 acres for runway extensions: 
Bensenville and Elk Grove Village to the west, and Des Plaines in the northeast. 
As OMP took off and SOC began to ramp up its campaign, the City of Chicago 
effectively undermined opposition by exploiting political fractures within the anti-OMP 
movement. The highly fragmented nature of the region’s political geography (in notable 
juxtaposition to Toronto) enabled the City of Chicago to target the benefits of OMP to appeal to 
the parochial interests of individual communities. Having been hit by the downturn in the 
aviation economy following 9/11, Des Plaines broke from SOC and welcomed the potential 
benefits of OMP for the city’s industrial base. The restructuring of prospective OMP flight paths 
                                                        
7 Most interviewees from the southern Chicago city-region continued to support Peotone Airport. However, capacity 
increases at Gary will likely result in its indefinite postponement. 
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proved instrumental in shifting Des Plaines’s political allegiances (see Budd, 2009). The Village 
embraced the freight and cargo development vision proffered for the O’Hare area (Cambridge 
Systematics, 2010; Chicago Metropolis 2020, 2004), adding c. 1.5 million feet2 of logistics space 
between 2003 and 2008 (Angell, interview, 2008). Other municipalities, including Itasca, 
Schaumburg and Wood Dale, welcomed the potential to mirror the established conference and 
business center development in suburbs, notably Rosemont, to the east of O’Hare. Faced with 
declining support and the apparent inevitability of OMP, SOC’s last stalwarts, Elk Grove Village 
and Bensenville, dropped their resistance as the old guard of municipal leadership was swept 
from office in 2008-2009 elections. 
 
4.3 Opening O’Hare to the region 
The issue of Western Access was a key factor in swaying suburban opinion on OMP, most 
pointedly in the case of DuPage County. Traditionally, the County’s predominantly Republican 
leadership adopted an isolationist position within the Chicago region and was often at the crux of 
the city-suburban antagonism (Hamilton, 2002). Fearing the displacement of jobs and residences, 
DuPage spent millions of dollars fighting the City of Chicago in court to oppose O’Hare 
expansion and contributed $14,000 annually to SOC through the 1990s (McCopplin, 2003). The 
County reversed its stance on O’Hare following a change in leadership on the County Board in 
2002. Board Chairman, Bob Schillerstrom, withdrew DuPage’s opposition to OMP in January 
2003, placing the burden of resistance on the dwindling number of municipalities in SOC. 
Interviews revealed that Chicago’s far western and north-western suburbs and satellite towns 
already welcomed the possibility to further tap into the O’Hare economy as they could take 
advantage of the synergies between global air connectivity and local economic development 
without suffering the negative externalities of airport growth. 
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The County’s shift was, in part, a reaction to the election of the pro-OMP Blagojevich; as 
DuPage Board member Brien Sheahan argued, “[OMP] is a project that is going to occur… 
We’re either going to have it imposed on us, or we can pull up a chair… and be a part of the 
shaping of the final plan” (cf. Meyer and Hilkevitch, 2003, p. 1). Yet as Sheahan indicated, it also 
reflected a change in philosophy as the County began to think in terms of competitive 
regionalism. The prospect of reorienting the physical space of O’Hare westward presented the 
opportunity to deepen DuPage’s integration within an aviation-based economy [FIGURE 1 
HERE]. Western Access catalyzed a spatial reimagining of the Airport’s position in the region 
that served to resolve the contradiction between local communities’ interests and regional 
demands for globalizing infrastructure; “the old leadership saw [O’Hare] as an economic engine 
for Chicago and Cook County. The new leadership sees it as an economic engine for the greater 
region” (DuPage County, interview, 2008). After signing on to OMP, the County conducted a 
$370,000 economic development study – jointly financed with the City of Chicago – projecting 
the program would add $3 billion and 12,000 jobs to DuPage County’s economy by 2015, 
increasing to $10 billion and 40,000 by 2030 (DuPage County, interview, 2008).  
DuPage leadership’s strategic shift hinged on the “post-political” reasoning that Western 
Access made OMP a universal benefit to the County (Deas, 2013). Yet Western Access poses a 
challenge for communities close to O’Hare. A northeast DuPage municipal planner attested:  
One could argue that Western Access could benefit [us] by providing more opportunities 
here to be connected to the region. At the same time, we have to balance that from [our] 
perspective. How many businesses are you going to be knocking out and how much 
property are you going to be taking… in order to get these connections? (DuPage County 
municipality, interview, 2009). 
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There is a sense that the imposition of a regional vision through a revanchist NIMBY politics – 
particularly the concentration of globally-integrated cargo distribution facilities around O’Hare – 
will lock airport-adjacent municipalities into overwhelming industrial development, 
fundamentally redefining their character: “We could just accept anything that comes into [the 
municipality]… [but] we don’t just want truck terminal and warehouses… we don’t want to be 
one big parking lot on [the west] of the Airport” (DuPage County municipality, interview, 2009). 
Former SOC members have begun to assert their voices in an attempt to shape the form and 
function of development around O’Hare. This move is most evident in the Illinois Department of 
Transportation’s (IDOT) planning process for the extension of the Western Bypass and Elgin-
O’Hare expressway, and the development of new transit facilities proposed in CMAP’s GO to 
2040 plan (see Figure 1).8  
Western Access would enable the westward flow of economic activity from the Airport, 
but with this, both DuPage County and municipal leaders have an increasing interest in gaining 
political influence for suburbs at O’Hare. This is to say, forging a new territorialized political 
“space of regionalism” that can leverage the “regional spaces” opened by urban-economic 
infrastructure to the competitive benefit of the County (Jones and MacLeod, 2004). Regionalizing 
the orientation of O’Hare away from Chicago challenges the existing territorially defined basis of 
the City’s airport governance regime as other communities and organizations stake their right to a 
seat at the table. Yet while IDOT has effectively brought together key interest groups and moved 
ahead with highway planning surrounding the Airport, the City of Chicago continues to set the 
agenda at O’Hare and oppose the suburbanization of its global infrastructure. This position 
                                                        
8 Elk Grove Village dropped their opposition to OMP on the basis of favorable IDOT highway alignments. Further, a 
municipal planner from northeast DuPage stressed their desire to locate a potential western terminal multi-modal 
transit within their jurisdiction.  By locating a transit terminal beyond airport grounds, the municipality believes they, 
rather than O’Hare (and subsequently the City of Chicago) could benefit economically from the facility (DuPage 
County municipality, interview, 2009).  
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partially supports Cidell’s (2006a, pp. 660-661) contention that in putting forward O’Hare 
expansion as a necessity for Chicago’s global economic competitiveness, the City was primarily 
concerned with maintaining control over its airports. It also reveals the volatile nature of the 
political and economic relationships through which the City governs regional aviation.  
While CDA (2012c) sees Western Access providing “a more balanced and efficient 
airport for the region” and the State views the project as “an essential element… needed to realize 
the full economic opportunities created by [OMP]” (Illinois General Assembly, 2003), the City of 
Chicago had not guaranteed the construction of a new western terminal, nor opening western 
access to O’Hare. This position expressed OMP’s contested funding within the tangled dynamics 
of “glocal infrastructure governance” (Torrance, 2008). Through the terms of American and 
United Airlines’ 1985 lease agreement at O’Hare (set to expire in 2018), the Airlines are 
obligated to finance capital improvements at the Airport in return for veto power over CDA 
plans. While a tentative agreement between the City and the airlines had been reached in 2005, 
the impact of the 2008-2009 Financial Crisis led American and United to file a contract dispute 
with the City of Chicago in an attempt to scale back OMP. In late 2010, facing a global decline in 
air travel, CDA and the Airlines agreed to postpone the development of a new western terminal 
until demand recovers. The particular dynamics of aero-regionalism in the Chicago city-region 
has therefore deprived suburban communities the central benefits promised in return for backing 
OMP. Instead, the City of Chicago appears likely to maintain the political and economic 
orientation of the Airport towards the central core of the city-region for the foreseeable future.  
 
5. Aero-regionalism after devolution: Establishing a city-regional fix in Toronto 
Aviation governance in Canada has followed a markedly different trajectory to that of the United 
States. Prior to 1994, the federal government, through Transport Canada, owned and operated the 
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nation’s major airports but the system Ottawa oversaw had become seriously overbuilt under 
spatial Keynesian programs pursued by Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau (1968-1979, 1980-1984). 
Many facilities were underutilized economic sinkholes. To redress the financial drain of 
maintaining the national air system, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney announced plans to privatize 
the operation of Canada’s airports in 1986. Jean Chrétien’s Liberal government continued the 
process through the 1994 National Airports Policy (NAP). The legislation tried to “move the 
Canadian transportation system into the 21st century” by rationalizing, and devolving 
responsibility for, a National Airport System (NAS) constituted by 26 “nationally-significant” 
airports to local airport authorities (Transport Canada, 1994). The NAP identified Pearson 
International Airport as southern Ontario’s sole NAS facility.  
 
5.1 Governing the regional airport 
The national deregulation and privatization of Canadian air transportation prompted a radical 
restructuring of airport governance in southern Ontario. Broad interest in renovating Pearson 
Airport motivated key governmental actors across the Toronto region to consider forming of a 
local airport authority. Indeed (and in contrast to Chicago), Pearson’s location in the city of 
Mississauga rather than the city of Toronto necessitated a regional agreement but political 
divisions between local governments sparked conflict over the nature and structure of such inter-
jurisdictional governance. It would be the interests of regional capital that broke the impasse. At 
the urging of the Toronto Board of Trade, an agreement was reached to incorporate the Greater 
Toronto Regional Airports Authority (GTRAA) as a non-profit corporation to run Pearson along 
business principles on March 3, 1993 (Greater Toronto Airports Authority, 2006, pp. 18-26). The 
GTRAA was restructured as a not-for-profit corporation overseen by a 15-person board with 
nominations from a variety of community interests and community liaison established through a 
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consultative committee in accordance with the NAP.9 Ottawa recognized the re-christened 
Greater Toronto Airports Authority (GTAA) as a Canadian Airports Authority in November 
1994. Terms of transfer were finalized in a 60-year Ground Lease, signed in December 1996 with 
the GTAA assuming responsibility for the operation, management and development of Pearson, 
including the ability to set airline rates and charges. Ottawa retained ownership of Pearson (along 
with all NAS airports outside Canada’s territories) as well as the ability to set ground rents and 
regulate flight numbers and hours of operation. The federal government’s continuing role marks 
the Canadian context as distinct from the United States. 
The GTAA views its governance structure (which underwent minor adjustments to the 
nomination and appointment process in 2003 and 2009) providing three key benefits as a model 
of airport governance. First, the Board of Directors provides representation for governmental and 
non-governmental bodies that defend the interests of multiple stakeholders. Second, as the Board 
consists of professionals rather than politicians, the GTAA can draw from a broad pool of 
technical expertise to guide airport operations and development. Third, as the GTAA is 
responsible for generating revenues to support its operations and does not rely on tax dollars, it 
can be more financially flexible than publicly owned facilities (Greater Toronto Airports 
Authority representative, interview, 2010). Several interviewees viewed the Authority as an 
exemplar of regional governance and a model that should be applied to other regional and 
transportation bodies, including Metrolinx. Yet, although the GTAA prides itself on the relations 
it fosters with other actors in region, it remains buffered from direct processes of local 
democracy. While the federal and provincial governments have the power to appoint GTAA 
directors directly, the Board selects directors from a list of nominees provided by the City of 
                                                        
9 The GTAA Board consists of Directors appointed by Ottawa (2); the Province (1); the municipalities of Toronto, 
Durham, Halton, Peel and York (5); members appointed by the Board itself (3); and non-governmental community 
nominees (4) (Greater Toronto Airports Authority, 2009).  
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Toronto and the regional municipalities (Greater Toronto Airports Authority, 2009). The GTAA 
is authorized to operate airports throughout south-central Ontario, yet they have little interest in 
expanding oversight to other facilities and are instead focused on improving operations at 
Pearson (Greater Toronto Airports Authority, 2011). Airport governance and management in 
southern Ontario therefore remain highly fragmented [TABLE 2 HERE]. 
 
5.2 Shaping Toronto’s aviation future 
Transport Canada had initiated master planning at Pearson following the Mulroney government’s 
1986 privatization announcement but the process proceeded slowly and with limited financial 
assistance from Ottawa. While the Airport’s existing infrastructure was capable of handling 28 
million passengers annually, Pearson already welcomed 24.2 million in 1996, with projected 
annual increases estimated between 1 and 2 million by the 2000s. Rapid growth of passenger 
numbers at Pearson meant expansion was a pressing issue for the newly formed GTAA. Under its 
first president and CEO, Louis Turpen, the GTAA rejected Transport Canada’s existing strategy 
of incremental infilling and terminal modification. In order to keep pace with growth and position 
Pearson as “Canada’s gateway to the world” (Turpen, cf. Greater Toronto Airports Authority, 
2006, p. 48), the Authority prepared the Airport Development Plan to completely overhaul the 
airport and construct a new terminal capable of handling 50 million passengers annually. Upon 
its opening on April 6, 2004, the GTAA (2003, p. 10) proclaimed the new Terminal 1 provided 
Toronto with an airport befitting an “emerging global metropolis”.  
Unlike OMP, Pearson’s Airport Development Program did not engender widespread 
public or political opposition: largely as a result of frustrations with antiquated airport facilities 
and the predominance of flight paths over industrial areas. However, the funding mechanisms 
utilized for the project drew criticism. The GTAA partially financed redevelopment through the 
 26 
sale of C$2.025 billion worth of multi-year capital bonds between 1997 and 2000 but additional 
costs have been recouped through increased fees. Landing charges for airlines flying into Pearson 
tripled between 1998 and 2005. Toronto acquired the unwelcome reputation of having the 
world’s highest landing fees which are reflected in the relatively higher cost of airlines doing 
business at Pearson and higher ticket prices (although a direct causal relationship between the 
two is difficult to measure). However, the GTAA points to the high costs of operating Pearson 
and the prohibitively high ground rents charged by Ottawa, in addition to the costs associated 
with the Airport Development Program (which increased the Airport’s economic potential), as 
key factors contributing to the landing fee calculations. Given Pearson’s status as the most 
lucrative airport in Canada, the federal governmental has been reluctant to restructure the 
Airport’s rent formula. 2005 projections suggested that the GTAA paid 63% of federal aviation 
rent revenue while handling 33% of the nation’s airport traffic (Toronto Star, 2005, p. A22). The 
lack of competition to Pearson enables both Ottawa and the GTAA to charge higher fees. Keil 
and Young (2008, p. 739) point to the potential significance of this intracapitalist contradiction 
for future regional development, but locally-dependent capital and labor will remain reliant upon 
Pearson as southern Ontario’s major international airport and sole NAS facility.  
Louis Turpen stepped down from the GTAA on September 30, 2004 after a controversial 
and challenging nine-year term, both for the new airport authority and the airline industry, which 
faced 9/11, SARS and escalating fuel costs. Under his leadership, the GTAA effectively oversaw 
the redevelopment of Terminal 1 but operated bullishly and with little oversight (Keil and Young, 
2008, p. 738). Responding to criticisms, the Authority has attempted to reposition itself as a 
regionalizing actor with strong ties to local governmental and community organizations. In 
moving from its initial phase of infrastructure development to focus on improving airport 
operations and service quality, the GTAA (2010; 2011) has emphasized community engagement 
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in their governance practices and now views itself as more accountable than in the past. By 
partnering in programs such as “Partners in Project Green”, a business-led initiative to develop 
12,000 hectares surrounding Pearson into an eco-business zone, the GTAA (2012) is emerging as 
a key stakeholder in urban growth beyond the Airport’s boundary. 
 
5.3 Mobilizing city-regional space: Integrating global and local circuits of mobility 
Improving relations with local and regional government has enabled the GTAA to address an 
over-riding issue for the competitiveness of both Pearson and the wider Toronto region: ground 
access to the Airport. Prior to GTAA’s takeover, Transport Canada dictated the operation and 
development of Pearson in a manner that removed Toronto’s international airport from the 
dynamics of regional growth and governance. A GTAA spokesman (interview, 2010) 
commented: “it was almost like the Airport was a black hole. Municipalities were doing their 
own thing all around it, but when it came to the airport boundaries, everything stopped, there was 
little integration”. Modernization programs coordinated with the Province in the 1960s and 1970s 
established highway connections to downtown via Highway 401 and the Gardiner Expressway 
but with these auto-centric links in place, transit connections to Pearson remained weak.  
In contrast to the Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) whose planners were long concerned 
with establishing strong transit access to O’Hare and Midway, the Toronto Transit Commission 
(TTC) – from its inception in 1954 – did not devote attention to extending rapid transit access to 
its regional air hub, instead focusing on local mobility between city and suburbs. Pearson 
developed as an auto-centric facility under the stewardship of the federal government, with the 
engrained assumption that driving was the principal mode of transport to the Airport. In 2007, 
less than one per cent of travelers arrived at Pearson via public transit (Metrolinx, 2008, p. 63). 
Congestion on Highways 401 and 427 is an emerging issue for the Airport, freight haulers and 
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offices in the Airport Corporate Center (McDonald, interview, 2009). The limited integration of 
global and local transport marks a significant difference between the Chicago and Toronto city-
regions. O’Hare (since 1983) and Midway (since 1993) are connected to the Loop by rapid transit 
(with plans to develop premium fast rail services), yet transit access from central Toronto to 
Pearson requires a 16-minute bus connection between the subway and airport terminals. The 
Province’s regional GO Transit network provides bus connections to Pearson from Richmond 
Hill, Brampton, Yorkdale and York Mills, but no link from downtown. 
Pearson’s weak transit connections have emerged as a pressing concern for public and 
private actors in the GTHA. The Toronto Board of Trade (2009) suggested synchronizing 
connections between the GTHA’s major international gateways and ensuring the expansion of 
transportation infrastructure are vital for Toronto’s economic prosperity. Metrolinx (2008, p. 21) 
has identified “high order transit connectivity to the Pearson Airport district from all directions” – 
including highway and road access, light rail transit (LRT), bus rapid transit (BRT) and a rail 
service – as a priority within its regional transportation plan. Connecting Pearson and Union 
Station, as Toronto’s principal international gateways via a new rail link is a central element of 
The Big Move (ibid, p. 63). However, while such fast rail service between air hubs and 
downtown materially articulates a particular logic of networked connectivity, it also engenders 
processes of local bypass by prioritizing the demands of valued global travellers over the needs of 
local everyday mobility (Graham and Marvin, 2001, p. 368). 
From the outset, the GTAA established a working relationship with Metrolinx that 
embraced the development of Pearson and its surrounding area as a mobility hub and economic 
center. While the exact nature of Pearson’s local connectivity is still uncertain (and contested in 
the case of a direct diesel rail link to Union Station), GTAA staff engaged in planning with the 
TTC and Metrolinx to identify potential LRT route alignments to the Airport (as an element of 
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Toronto’s “Transit City” Plan, see Addie, 2013). The rationale for developing such multimodal 
connections has been discursively framed with specific reference to aerotropolis development in 
a manner that highlights: (1) the GTAA’s aspiration to emulate Frankfurt Airport, Amsterdam’s 
Schiphol Airport and newly-built Asian airport cities; and (2) the desire to utilize mass transit 
lines to make the airport a destination rather than just an in-transit location that will function as a 
catalyst for local urban development. The development of Pearson as a regional mobility hub is 
focused on attracting businesses in high-growth industries to locate corporate offices adjacent to 
the Airport and supporting the logistical benefits of airport proximity with connections to housing 
and entertainment. Redressing ground access deficiencies at Pearson has placed the Airport 
firmly on the city-regional transportation agenda in a manner that strongly contrasts to airport and 
regional planning frameworks in northeastern Illinois.  
 
6. Developing air infrastructure in, and for, global city-regions 
The case studies of aero-regionalism in Chicago and Toronto illustrate the extent to which 
airports, as economic, political and symbolic spaces, occupy positions of increased centrality in 
an era of competitive city-regionalism. Airports territorialize globalization in place; shrinking 
relative space between global hubs and extending the relational linkages producing global city-
regions through a mosaic of sociotechnical and political networks. They further provide a means 
to inscribe discourses of modernity and competition on urban space. Yet as Pascoe (2001 p. 135) 
notes, airports face rapid obsolescence as the pace of technological development outpaces the 
capacities of the fixed capital sunk into the built environment. Antiquated facilitates, congested 
skies and burgeoning infrastructure deficits present barriers to accumulation for local elites (Erie, 
2004). Propelled by the imperatives of deregulated competition and tropes of global 
competitiveness, international air hubs in northeastern Illinois and southern Ontario have become 
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loci for substantial expansion and redevelopment programs at the same time as their governance 
regimes and territoriality become markedly more intricate.  
Evidence from Chicago and Toronto indicates that competition between air hubs is being 
framed at the global level while the discourses and practices of airport governance clearly 
internalize the logics of globalized economic competitiveness (Keil, 2011). Even as they scale 
back expansion plans following the Financial Crisis, CDA (2012c) posits, “OMP has truly been 
our region’s economic stimulus package… putting thousands of people to work, rebuilding our 
infrastructure and keeping businesses in our City and our state”. The ability to promote global 
spatial imaginaries has chiefly come from the concentration of power in CDA, backed by aligned 
elite interests within Chicago’s growth machine. In southern Ontario, the tropes of global 
competitiveness, the centralization of Toronto within a global air network, and the development 
of Pearson as a leading air and ground hub continue to hold a comparable position of prominence 
in the GTAA’s (2009; 2011) strategic planning objectives. The post-politicizing function of these 
discourses, however, tends to conceal targeted investment in, and the governance of, global 
airports as expressly benefitting global urban elites (Deas, 2013; MacLeod, 2011). 
Internalized globalization and the topologies of air travel characterize international 
airports as sites of deterritorialization and points of assemblage within a relational space of flows. 
Yet, globalization processes by necessity invoke “the production and continual reproduction of 
fixed socio-territorial infrastructures” (Brenner, 2004, p. 56). This is to say that “the global”, so 
often the abstract spatial imaginary appealed to in airport discourses, is embedded within a 
complex, on-going and locally contingent restructuring and negotiation of scale. The game of 
global competitiveness is played out through the dynamics of place-specific city-regional politics 
and the struggle to legitimize governance at the interface of state restructuring and 
reterritorialization (Cochrane, 2012). Indeed, airport governance in the Chicago and Toronto city-
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regions has remained a public concern (despite some tentative interest in privatizing Midway). 
This reflects wider fears that ceding control of global aviation assets may impinge upon the 
state’s capacity to control the political and economic externalities of air travel and lessen the 
ability of local authorities to influence city-regional growth (May and Hill, 2006). Competitive 
concerns have prompted the formation of city-regional projects in which the imperatives of 
economic globalization has tended to subsume local interests, most clearly in SOCs fated 
opposition to OMP. Here, city-regionalism does not center on securing effective land-use 
management or managing a politics of collective provision within the internal geography of urban 
regions (Jonas, 2013; Jonas, While and Gibbs, 2010). Rather, aero-regionalism predominantly 
pivots on the geoeconomic pressures faced by competition states. Large-scale infrastructure 
investments, as a state spatial strategy, are codified as a prerequisite for global competitiveness. 
This conforms to broader trends of “deep neoliberalization” that entrench regional units within 
supranational circuits of capital accumulation (Brenner et al., 2010). 
While the language and normative appeal of the aerotropolis have gained prominence in 
planning dialogues surrounding O’Hare and Pearson Airports, the global networks territorialized 
by airport infrastructure have held a decentered, if vital, position within the case city-regions’ 
respective governance frameworks. Yet the aerotropolis is not a singular entity and the city-
region is not a collective actor. The imperatives of global city-regionalization, driven by 
competitive urban regimes, capture the “real existing regionalism” of both cases in a mix of 
territorial, rhetorical and technological change which internalizes on-going and contested 
multiscalar urban processes (Addie and Keil, in press). The complex spatial politics mobilized 
through the relationality/territoriality dialectic (McCann and Ward, 2010) have embroiled O’Hare 
and Pearson Airports within an unstable geopolitics of city-regional growth and governance.  
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As infrastructure fixes, investment in global airports has attempted capture geographically 
restless capital in ways that are conditioned by actors (business elites, politicians at various levels 
of government, airline executives and local communities) operating with varying structural 
capacities and differing territorial interests. This is particularly important as although airports are 
generative nodes of extra-local relations and flows “connections between air transportation and 
globalization are contingent on the political, economic, and geographical characteristics of place” 
(Cidell, 2006a, p. 661). The divergent modes of governance underpinning aero-regionalism in the 
Chicago and Toronto city-regions have resulted in differing pathways to infrastructure 
improvement and different approaches to territorializing urban and regional development (see 
Table 1). In Chicago, the intertwining of city politics and aviation governance produces a mode 
of territoriality and discourse of global competitiveness based around the municipality (opposed 
to city-region) as the strategic mechanisms supporting airport development. Although CDA is 
investigating increased regional connectivity to O’Hare, the City remains wary of catalyzing 
globally integrated economic activity through the regionalization processes potentially unleashed 
by Western Access. The interests of the City of Chicago present a continuing and significant 
barrier to the regionalization of airport governance. A CTA planner highlighted the challenge that 
the City faces in regionalizing the governance of O’Hare, noting that while there are intriguing 
transit and mobility possibilities surrounding a Western Terminal – including opening rapid 
transit and commuter rail access to employment hubs west of the Airport – the CTA “has a vested 
interested in making sure that the downtown of Chicago continues to be a vibrant, viable place to 
do business and that all of the development doesn’t shift to the northwest because we’ve already 
made significant investments in the downtown” (Busby, interview, 2009). 
An established lack of integration between regional land-use, transportation and airport 
planning perpetuates the problematic political position of O’Hare within the Chicago city-region. 
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GO to 2040 includes proposals to develop highway and transit infrastructure around O’Hare, but 
in contrast to Metrolinx’s Big Move, CMAP’s (2010, pp. 243-322) discussion of regional 
mobility is detached from CDA’s plans and stops short of O’Hare’s boundaries. Pearson is 
integrated in Metrolinx’s regional transportation plan as a regional gateway hub and the GTAA 
has welcomed the prospect of deepening the Airport’s institutional and infrastructural embedding 
in the region through multimodal transportation facilities. During the master planning process, 
the GTAA resolved to focus access to Pearson at its existing location. Consequently, the 
Authority has not reoriented Pearson westward towards the economically booming municipalities 
of Brampton and Mississauga, nor has it engendered inter-jurisdictional conflict over airport-
oriented development. The federal NAS provides a regulatory backbone limiting local 
competition while enabling the GTAA to adopt an aggressive program of local infrastructure and 
air network expansion; a luxury not afforded to O’Hare in the United States’ environment of 
heightened intra-national competition. 
 
7. Conclusion 
This paper has introduced the concept of aero-regionalism to analyze the planning and 
governance of major airports as they operate within overarching processes of global city-
regionalization. Globalization may take off and land on the runways of major airports, but the 
complex dynamics of present-day state spatiality and global networked flows internalized within 
global airports resonate well beyond the taxiways and terminals of these territorial gateways. The 
paper’s comparative study of Chicago and Toronto has demonstrated that competitive economic 
globalization, state spatiality and the political economy of large-scale infrastructure are mediated 
and territorialized through the symbiotic, production of urban and air space. Viewing airports as 
contested sociospatial permanences enables the conceptual incorporation of air transport’s 
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mobility and moorings (Urry, 2009) within the relationality/territoriality dialectic underpinning 
city-regional urbanization (McCann and Ward, 2010).  
Aero-regionalism contributes to our understanding of the relationship between global 
urbanization and air transport, as well as the debated processes of city-regionalism, by 
demonstrating how international air hubs are not only generative nodes of economic activity 
located in metropolitan areas, but are fundamentally conditioned by their regional context. The 
technical and social infrastructures of global airports regionalize in important material, political 
and symbolic ways, but the numerous multiscalar relations and vast fixed capital brought together 
by air infrastructure make them difficult for territorially defined actors to operate, plan and 
govern (McNeill, 2011). By embedding the territoriality and modalities of urban politics 
engendered by airports within broader processes of city-regionalism, aero-regionalism not only 
reveals the complexity of unstable and evolving regional governance processes unfurling in the 
Chicago and Toronto city-regions (Addie, 2013), but demonstrates the ways in which the 
political and morphological dimensions of global city-regions are structured through a contested 
politics of mobility. Centering the spatial politics unfurling at the nexus of internal city-regional 
restructuring and global topologies of urban connectivity within studies of “real existing 
regionalism” (Addie and Keil, in press) offers the opportunity to unpack: (1) the political 
implications of competition states’ spatial projects; and (2) strategic actions and examine how 
issues of political territoriality and governance structure the actual production of airport-
integrated urbanization. 
The struggle to control and scale city-regional mobility evident within the dynamics of 
aero-regionalism tests the boundaries of territorial governance and representation. Processes of 
airport planning, as advocates of “airport city” development contend, must extend beyond 
established technical practices to incorporate wider aspects of urban development (Güller and 
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Güller, 2003; Kasarda and Lindsay, 2011). However, the on-going political contestation and 
governance restructuring detailed in the cases of Chicago and Toronto is evidence that 
incorporating globalizing infrastructure into local planning regimes interpolates a dynamic scalar 
politics. The importance of Chicago’s O’Hare Airport within national and international air 
networks has led issues of local competitiveness, mobilized through spatial politics defined by 
the interests of the City of Chicago and buffered by the institutional position of CDA, to bypass 
opposition to OMP and calls to expand air capacity on a regional basis. As SOC’s members 
discovered, strategic investment in global airport infrastructure continues to prioritize capital 
mobility and the material and symbolic processes of globalization while engendering profound, 
path-dependent, development trajectories in surrounding urban-regional space. Vast industrial, 
warehousing and distribution facilities extend along the highways adjacent to both Chicago’s and 
Toronto’s international airports, locking surrounding communities into specific economic growth 
trajectories despite local objections. While the regionalization strategies employed in the Toronto 
city-region have opened avenues of inclusion for “different knowledge traditions” in airport 
management, it is important to note that this does not necessarily equate to more democratic or 
socially just governance. The politics of mobility produced through the elevation of “premium 
network spaces” engenders distinct challenges for the social and material spaces cleaved from 
city-regional networks by processes of global bypass (Graham and Marvin, 2001; Young and 
Keil, 2010). The privileging of advanced regional connectivity and globally integrated gateways 
is likely to be internalized as a defining characteristic of global city-regions. Planners, policy-
makers and community activists must therefore engage a complex set of economic, political and 
sociotechnical interests in order to effectively manage globally-integrated, economically-viable 
and socially just air hubs. 
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Table 1: Regionalism and airport development in the Chicago and Toronto city-regions 
 
Regional system Chicago city-region Toronto city-region 
Regional 
jurisdictions and 
political 
dynamics 
Six county area (Cook, DuPage, Kane, 
McHenry and Will counties) contains 
267 municipalities with significant home 
rule powers; high levels of jurisdictional 
fragmentation and antagonism between 
the City of Chicago and surrounding 
suburbs; city-region extends into Indiana 
and Wisconsin 
Greater Toronto Area (GTA) consists of 
the City of Toronto and four municipal-
regions (Durham, Halton, Peel, York) 
containing a total of 24 municipalities. 
History of regional governance and spatial 
Keynesian programs directed by the 
Province of Ontario 
Regional 
transportation and 
planning agencies 
Chicago Metropolitan Agency for 
Planning (CMAP): integrates land-use 
and transportation planning in the six-
county area and Kendall county 
Metrolinx: manages and coordinate 
transportation in the Greater Toronto and 
Hamilton Area (GTHA)  
Regional plans  Go to 2040 (2010): premised upon: (1) 
smart urbanization; effective investment 
in human capital; (3) transparent 
governance reform; (4) integrated 
multimodal transportation planning 
The Big Move (2008): regional 
transportation plan guiding infrastructure 
investments to direct growth in 
accordance with provincial Places to 
Grow and Greenbelt Acts 
Airport system   
Primary airport 
authority 
Chicago Department of Aviation (CDA): 
municipal department of the City of 
Chicago reporting to the Mayor’s Office 
Greater Toronto Airports Authority 
(GTAA): regional not-for-profit 
corporation overseen by a 15-member 
board  
Primary int’l 
airport 
Chicago O’Hare International Airport, 
Chicago, IL (CDA) 
Toronto Pearson International Airport, 
Mississauga, ON (GTAA) 
Secondary 
airports  
 
Chicago Midway International Airport, 
Chicago, IL (CDA) 
Gary/Chicago International Airport, 
Gary, IN (Chicago/Gary Airport 
Authority) 
Billy Bishop Toronto City (Island) 
Airport, Toronto, ON (Transport Canada, 
City of Toronto, Toronto Port Authority) 
John C. Munro Hamilton International 
Airport, Hamilton, ON (City of Hamilton 
and TradePort International Corporation) 
Proposed airports  
 
Peotone Airport, Peotone, IL (State of 
Illinois) 
Pickering Airport, Pickering, ON 
(Transport Canada) 
Airport 
authority’s 
regional role 
Little formal engagement; separate from 
local and regional transportation and 
land-use planning; some informal 
connections 
Moderate regional engagement; working 
with Metrolinx on ground access 
integration; developing ties with local 
business and community groups 
Major airport 
redevelopment 
projects 
O’Hare Modernization Program, $6.6 
billion, 2003-on-going: (1) restructure 
runways into six parallel and two 
crosswind strips; (2) develop public road 
access, parking facilities and a new 
passenger terminal (Western Access) 
Pearson Airport Redevelopment Program, 
C$4.4 billion, 1997-2007: (1) expand 
infield cargo and maintenance facilities; 
(2) construct new dual runways and 
taxiways; (3) develop a new Terminal 1 to 
replace existing Terminals 1 and 2 
Regional 
response to 
airport 
redevelopment 
Strong backing from urban growth 
regime, Concerted, but fractured, 
opposition from local municipalities and 
south suburban actors backing Peotone 
Airport 
Broad regional consensus around needs to 
update outmoded facilities, little public 
opposition due to Pearson’s location, 
flight paths over industrial areas; some 
resentment surrounding transferred costs 
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Table 2: Regional airport governance in southern Ontario 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a That expansion plans continue apace at the Island Airport – despite strident opposition from former Mayor David Miller and a coalition of central city activists – starkly 
illustrates the divergent structural capacities of Chicago and Toronto’s mayors. While Miller could not realize his desired closure of the Island Airport, Chicago’s Mayor 
Daley sent a fleet of privately contracted bulldozers in the middle of the night of March 31, 2003 to carve up the runway of Meigs Field, Chicago’s small lakefront airport. 
Chicago subsequently developed a lakefront park while Toronto hosts a burgeoning downtown commuter airport with flights arriving and departing next to residential towers. 
b In 2005, landing a Boeing 747 at Pearson would cost an airline an estimate C$16,500 compared to C$5,000 at Hamilton, while Boeing 737s would cost C$3,800 at Toronto 
and C$1,000 at Hamilton (Macleod, 2005). The GTAA has developed fee incentive initiatives which offer airlines already flying into Pearson reduced costs in return for more 
flights. Federal bilateral agreements, however, limit how often airlines can fly into Pearson while federal quotas restrict flights between 12:30am and 6am.
Airport Governing authority Role in the regional air system Prospects for regionalizing airport governance 
Toronto Pearson 
International Airport 
GTAA International hub and gateway 
airport; significant cargo operations  
Operated by the GTAA 
Billy Bishop Toronto 
City (Island) Airport 
Tripartite Agreement between the 
federal government, City of Toronto, 
Toronto Port Authority (succeeded 
the Toronto Harbour Commission in 
1999) 
Turboprop regional service to 
Canadian and American cities; 
contested expansion proposals would 
accommodate jet aircraft and longer 
distance flights 
Number of actors involved and complexity of the Island 
Airport’s governance regime are difficult to untangle and 
present a major impediment to regional integration; 
political issues continue to surround the Airport and future 
development plansa 
John C. Munro 
Hamilton 
International Airport 
Public-private partnership between 
the City of Hamilton and TradePort 
International Corporation (with 
operational guidance from 
Vancouver Airport Authority) 
Limited seasonal and charter flights 
to Canadian cities and tourist 
destinations in the United States, 
Latin America and the Caribbean; 
significant cargo operations 
 
 
Lower taxes and fees and no restrictions on night 
operations make Hamilton Airport a regional competitor 
for air cargo, but Hamilton lacks a critical mass of cargo 
facilities and proximity to key markets, transport routes 
and warehousing centers;b GTAA views Hamilton Airport 
as too far from Toronto to serve as an major passenger 
hub, but it does act as a relief airport for Pearson 
Pickering Airport 
(proposed) 
18,600 hectare site owned by the 
federal government and the decision 
to build the Airport lies with 
Transport Canada; GTAA has the 
right to operate Pickering Airport 
should it be developed and has 
conducted preliminary planning for 
Transport Canada 
Pickering could relieve passenger and 
cargo congestion at Pearson and 
stimulate economic and urban 
development in eastern GTA; plans 
first announced in 1972 and 
postponed in 1975; prospect of 
developing Pickering Airport often 
used for political leverage by actors 
interested in expanding capacity at 
other Toronto area airports 
Transport Canada asserts Pickering Airport would be a 
prime location for a new regional airport and is supported 
by several local governments, but faces strong local 
opposition; GTAA has conducted interim planning at 
Pickering for Transport Canada, but stresses capacity for 
further expansion at Pearson Airport can accommodate 
regional air traffic demands for the foreseeable future; 
distance from existing concentrations are problematic for 
freight movement 
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Figure 1: Opening O’Hare to the region. Proposed highway and transit improvements 
will significantly reshape O’Hare International Airport’s connectivity to northeastern 
Illinois’s west and northwestern suburbs. The Elgin-O’Hare Expressway extension (with 
the option to integrate CTA El service and DuPage County’s J-Line BRT network), and 
the O’Hare Western Bypass will increase regional highway and transit capacity and 
relieve congestion to the east. However, regionalizing access to global flows does not 
necessarily engender the parallel creation of politically defined “spaces of regionalism” 
through which airport expansion could be operationalized and contested. This is 
problematic since the Western Bypass requires the annexation of lands from either 
Bensenville or Franklin Park. Adapted from DuPage County (2006). 
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